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STEVEN COHEN 
In the past decade we have heard a good deal of political, popular, 
and scholarly discussion of the concept of regulation. Regulation is 
criticized for harming the economy. stifling entrepreneurial initiative, 
discouraging technological advances and for being insufficiently cost 
effective. Economists criticize lawyers for being overly formalistic and 
nat understanding how firms behave. Policymakers criticize econo-
mists for proposing policies that seem sensible but are not politically 
feasible. In iny view, however, the most competitive economies of the 
twenty-first century are likely to be those that protect the environment 
at the least possible cost. This will require the development of patterns 
of institutional interaction that are far more cooperative than those of 
industry and environmental agencies in the United States. If an eco-
logically sustainable economy is to be achieved in the United States, 
industry II).ust become convinced of the economic advantages of pol-
lution prevention and resource conservation. 
This chapter addresses the issues surrounding effective regula-
tion. Understanding the procedures involved in the development and 
implementation of regulation is the first step. I then describe the tools 
of strategic regulation, Next, criticisms of different modes of regula-
tion are discussed. The chapter concludes with a summary of the stra-
tegic approach to regulation. 
-I gratefully acknowledge the resean:h assistance of Pamela Caird (Columbia MPA '96), 
Bonnie Mackey (MPA '96), and Dorena Rodriguez (Colwnbia MPA '96). 
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DEFINING REGULATION 
Kenneth Meir has defined regulation as "any attempt by the gOY· 
ernment to control the behavior of citizens, corporations, or sub-
governments" (Meir 1985, p.l). Regulationjs a set of rules or directives 
intended to cause specific behaviors in target populations. Modifying 
his definition slightly, I would substitute the word "influence" for 
"control." Regulated behaviors in my view represent tendencies and 
incremental actions rather than goal-seeking, rationally controlled 
behaviors, Control is sirhply too strong a term. Organizations for the 
most part do not truly control their own actions; instead, these actions 
are the result of a variety of intenuil exchange relationships and influ-
ence evidenced by explicit and implicit bargains and the deployment 
of potential and actual incentives. . 
The goal of regulation is to influence individual or organizational 
behavior. To provide a graphic example, consider the case of automo-
biles converging at a corner traffic light. The behavior of the driver is 
hopefully influenced by the color of the traffic light. The signal 
is relatively clear, although when the light turns amber the driver is 
faced with~ the need to make a qUick decision (slow down or speed 
up?). What factors affect the driver's decision to slow down, speed up, 
or stop? Certainly, the follo'w~g factors come into play: 
1. Is the signal working? 
2, Does the driver see and understand the signal? 
3. Is the driver willing to adhere to the signal? 
4. Is the car mechanically capable of stopping and/or 
accelerating? 
Are the regulated parties, in this case the drivers, capable of chang-
ing behavior in the desired direction and are they willing to do so? 
The goal of regulation is to influence the variables that enter into a 
regulated party's calculus of the costs and benefits of compliance. What 
are the incentives and disincentives to stopping at a red light? 
1. An incentive to stop might be the presence of a fully loaded 
trailer truck that will hit the driver if he/she does hot stop. 
2. A second incentive to stop might be the ticket the highway 
patrol ~fficer could give the driver if he/she goes through 
the light. 
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3. A third incentive to stop might be the driver's bl:"ljef in the 
rule of law. ' 
4. Another incentive to stop may be a pre-patterned behavior 
which causes the driver to see a red light and move his/her 
foot toward the brake. 
5. A disincentive to stop might arise if the driver has a se-
verely ill child sitting in the back seat, and the driver is on 
the way to a hospital. 
6. A second disincentive to stop might arise if there were no 
traffic visible and the driver was in a hurry. 
The goal of traffic regulation is to reinforce the incentives to com-
ply so that they outvveigh the potential motivation to pass the red 
light. The goal of regulation is to influence the perceptions and behav-
iors of regulated parties. Therefore, each regulatory program must be 
based on a sfIategy that seeks to understand the motivations of regu-
lated parties and to influence their behavior. 
HOW TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT A 
REGULATORY STRATEGY 
Strategic regulatory planning is an effort by government to develop a 
comprehensive strategy or tactic for influencing behavior. There are 
two components to this plan. The first is the formal regulation itself. 
The second part is the manner in which the regulatory plan is imple-
mented. Extra-regulatory elements that can be manipulated to encour-
age compliance include funding, technical assistance, exhortation, and 
publicity. The goal of this type of regulation is not to alter the behavior 
of the implementing agencies, as with many goverrunent programs, 
but to modify the behavior of private parties. Therefore, a 'carefully 
considered strategy and tactical thinking are important in accomplish-
ing compliance. 
In earlier work on regulation, Cohen and Kamieniecki (1991) 
developed a seven-step model for strategic regulatory plaruting. The 
model built on the work of those.in the field of business strategy 
formulation and included the following steps: 
1. Problem recognition: What is at issue? 
2. Identification of parties: Who is involved? 
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THE TOOLS OF STRATEGIC REGULATION 
The term command and control has been used to describe a process 
where government commands a regulated party to act in a certain 
way and then uses the legal system to control behaviors that are not 
in compliance with the rules. As Cohen and Kamieniecki (1991) write, 
the traditional notion of command and control is a very simplistic 
view of regulation. In their view, regulation involves all goverrunent 
policies and programs deployed to influence the behavior of regulated 
parties. Their definition of regulation includes command and control 
regulation, the use of market mechanisms, and a wide variety of other 
techniques of influence. 
There is no neai to choose between command and control and 
market mechanisms. Neither is necessarily better than the other. Rather, 
each target of regulation must be assessed to determine what mix of 
incentives and disincentives will result in the desired change in be-
havior. Alternative regulatory strategies include both coercive and 
relatively noncoercive actions. All things being equal, policytriakers 
will prefer ,to use the least coercive methods that obtain the desired 
results at the least cost. The regulatory actions discussed below should 
be seen as a partial listing of activities typically available to regulators 
to influence the behavior of regulated parties. Some of the key regu-
latory techniques available to policymakers include: 
• Market solutions and economic incentives: Government, 
for example, sells permits to pollute to firms who may only 
pollute to the level allowed in the permit and may sell 
these permits to other private parties. This encourages per-
mit holders to reduce their own level of pollution and 
maximize the cost effectiveness of pollution controL The 
deposit/refund system is another example of market incen-
tives. A surcharge or deposit is assessed on products that 
may cause environmental damage when they are disposed 
of incorrectly. The buyer returns the product to the seller 
for proper action and the deposit. Similar incentive pro-
grams include financial rewards, elimination of resource 
extraction subsidies, and post-consum~ waste content 
requirements. 
Insurance programs: Government requires private parties 
to carry insurance in order to clean up unanticipated re-
leases of pollution and compensate victims of negative 
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environmental impacts. For example, the owner of a gaso-
line station might be required to carry insurance to pay for 
the cost of cleaning up any gasoline leaks, and to pay third 
party liability claims arising from these leaks. 
• Self-regulation: Government permits an indus~ to re~­
late itself. The use of industry codes and professIonal ethics 
are examples of such- self-regulation. 
Taxes and fees: Government charges regulated parties for 
each unit of pollution or waste created. Alternatively, a tax 
is placed· on the raw material that eventually causes .the 
pollution, as in Superfund's tax on petrole~ and chenucal 
feedstocks. 
Education, info,rmation disclosure, and the use of the 
media: Government informs the public about regulatory 
violations or about dangers, causing negative public rela-
tions for a company. An example is the warning label ~­
quirement on cigarettes. Government may also use tJ:e media 
to educate regulated parties about regulatory reqUIrements 
and their purpose. 
Reporting and formal compliance trac~ng: G~vernm~t 
requires regulated parties to report on thelt compliance Wl~ 
rules. This is less expensive than inspections and can begm 
the process of cre~ting the institutional capaci~ in regu-
lated firms to comply with a rule. Whoever fills o~t the 
form must at least pay some attention to the regulation. 
Licensing: Government certifies competent professiona~ 
who can assist with compliance. A good example of this 
method is _the regulation of Certified Public Accountan~, 
who assure compliance with tax regulations. In the enVl-
ronmental area it might be possible to certify environmen-
tal auditors and other professionals who could help a firm 
reduce and prevent pollution. 
Permitting: Government requires £inns to obtain a permit 
in order to pollute legally. A permit can call !or gradual 
reductions in pollution. The absence of a perrrut can result 
in a judicial order to close a factory. 
Standard setting: This is the traditional command. part of 
command and control regulation. There are two baSIC types 
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of standards. The first type is the performance standard, 
which requires the accomplishment of specific goals but 
does not specify how one achieves those goals. A second 
type of standard specifies a process, technology, or practice 
that a regulated party must deploy to be in compliance 
with a rule. This simplifies compliance and oversight of 
regulatory compliance by requiring a specific, easily 
measurable activity. However, it also reduces the discretion 
a finn has to determine the most cost-effective mode of 
compliance. 
Grants, traiqjng, and compliance assistance: Many of the 
targets of regulation are individuals and small businesses 
that are willing to comply but lack the capability or resources 
to do so. Sometimes grants, loans, or even loan guarantees 
can help a small business obtain the capital needed to com-
ply with a regulation. Training and consulting services can 
also have a large impact, especially in areas where regula-
tion and technologies are new. 
Assessing penalties: Penalties are typically fines charged 
against violators. Penalties are particularly complex disin-
centives that must be used with great care. A penalty that 
is too low is simply absorbed into the cost of doing busi-
ness. A penalty that is too high can result in extensive liti-
gation and high transaction costs for the agency. It can also 
lead to illicit avoidance behavior and/or political opposi-
tion to the legitimacy of the regulation and even the regu-
lator. Nevertheless, as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
has learned, a well-targeted penalty with sufficient public-
ity can result in widespread compliance to an agency's rules. 
Inspections: Visits by regulators to regulated parties to de-
termine compliance is an important part of the traditional 
command and control model. Inspections provide evidence 
that regulated parties are following the rules. A more im-
portant use of inspections, especially if they are random 
and unannounced, is to stimulate compliant behavior due 
to fear of an impending ittspe~tion.' Many people keep care-
ful tax records out of fear that one day they will be exam-
ined by an IRS tax auditor. 
Adjudication: Formal adjudication is an administrative or 
judicial trial to determine if a regulated party has violated 
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a rule. The threat of adjudication can often promote compli-
ant behavior. 
This list of regulatory activities is by no means exhaustive, but 
it provides a behavioral-based operational definition of regulation. 
Each of these techniques has benefits and limitations and is most 
effective when deployed as part of a carefully considered strategy 
for influencing regulated parties. While the attacks on both command 
and control and market-oriented regulation are misguided, and the 
result Qf a narrow view of regulation, a review of the debate can help 
illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of these forms of regula-
tion. It may suggest the type of situations and the phases in program 
implementation where command and control an.d market mechanisms 
are most useful. 
CRITICISMS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL REGULATION 
The fundamental criticism of command and control regulation is 
that it is a wasteful way to produce a social good. While it has 
worked effectively in some situations, its successes often come at a 
high price. According to Maury Weidenbaum (1992), the start of the 
1990s marked a shift of the pendulum back toward regulation. 
Weidenbaum believes that regulation is a burden on the American 
ec0r:t0my, and he citE!s the example of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments, which in his view created an administrative nightmare for 
business and government alike. A decade earlier, writing in a similar 
vein, Robert Utan and William Nordhaus noted that "a dispassion-
ate observer may fairly conclude that the rise of increasingly strin-
gent. command-and-control techniques as a method of regulation 
has poorly served the American economy" (Utan and Nordhaus 
1983, p. 98). While the 1994 mid-term elections may have indicated 
new 'widespread public support for this sentiment, there is in fact 
a longstanding, recurrent critique of government regulation as 
unwarranted interference in the private economy. Marshall Breger 
et a1. (1991) observe that the experience of the 1970s and 1980s has 
caused a recognition of the limits of traditional command and con-
trol regulation. Command and control has inhibited technological 
progress when it has commanded the use of specific control 
technologies such as catalytic convertors and scrubbers. Such 
requirements tend to freeze technological progress in place, making 
it 4ifficult for more effective technologies to gain acceptance in the 
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market place. Command and control has also tended to discourage 
cost-benefit analysis of regulatory programs. 
While ~ass Sunstein nO,tes that command' and control regulation 
has worked ill the areas of arr and water pollution as well as highway 
and occupational safety, he also observes that: -
... regula~on has frequently failed. Sometimes it has imposed enor-
mously high costs for speCUlative benefits; sometimes it has accom-
plished little or nothing.; and sometimes it has aggravated the very 
problem it was designed to solve (Sunstein 1990, pAll). 
Richard Stroup md Jane Shaw (1989) attack the concept of gov-
ernment regulation itself. They do not accept the argument that a 
clean environment is a public good that requires collective action to be 
maintained. They argue that the command and control system of regu-
lati?n i,s "beset w~th difficulties" (Stroup and Shaw 1989, p.30). They 
mamt~ that envIronmental policies are determined by special inter-
est polItics, and are "often driven by groundless accusations [and1 
supported.~y public fear." In th~ view, "populist sentiment and pork-
barrel pohtics, rather than actual environmental dangers, currently 
determine priorities" (Stroup and Shaw 1989, p. 31). Stroup and Shaw 
contend that the free market is capable of protecting the environment: 
Over the long run, private ownership is the most effective protector 
of the environment-provided ownership is transferable and backed 
by courts that make people liable when their pollutants invade the 
person or prope~ of others. This system of private ownership would 
protect the enVIronment for the same reason that it protects other 
kinds of property: because it encourages good stewardship (Stroup 
and Shaw 1989, p.31). _ 'r 
~ principal argument against conunand and control regulation is 
that It places too much burden pn administrative agencies to deal with 
an increasingly complicated economy. ~e effort to classify and regu-
lat~ hazardous wa~te, toxics, and pesticides are examples of techno-
IOgIc.aI. dev~opment~ in the economy outstripping the capacity of 
admini~trative agencles to regulate them. Citing the complexity of 
regulating the vast number and types of solid wastes, William Pedersen 
(1991) argues that without a tax or other market oriented mechanism 
it will be impossible to provide adequate regulation of these wastes~ 
Another argument against command and control is that, at times, 
overly stringent regulatory standards can be difficult to implement. 
Cass Sunstein maintains that 
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A stringent standard-one that forbids balancing or calls for regula-
tion beyond the point of "feasibility" -makes regulators reluctant to 
act ... Their inaction is not caused by venality or confusion. Instead, 
it reflects their quite plausible belief that the statute often requires 
them to regulate to an absurd point ... a stringent standard will 
mobilize opposition to regulation ... it will require agencies to ob-
tain greater supporting information to survive political and judicial 
scrutiny, while at the same time making it less likely that such infor· 
mation will be forthcoming from regulated class members (Sunstein 
1990, p. 416). 
Richard B. Stewart notes that command-and~control regulation was 
"an understandable, first generation response to environmental 
problems ... When the Earth Day explosion of interest in environmen-
tal problems came along, there was a perception that urgent things 
needed to be done ... and that the most effective and appropriate way 
was to require specific controls on emissions and later, specific prac~ 
tices for disposal of to,qc wastes" (Stewart in Breger et aI. 1991, p. 467). 
While it may have worked at first, " ... it is often, from industry's 
viewpoint cheaper t~ inve'st in litigation and delay than to find inno-
vative ways to comply" (Stewart in Breger et al. 1991, p. 468). 
In summary, command and control regulation can impede inno-
vation, slow down the economy, cost too much; and be administra-
tively cumbersome. In addition, it often relies too much on politics to 
set environmental goals. Given these drawbacks, it seems that using 
the market to protect the environment ought to be a viable alternative. 
While the theory behind market mechanisms seems sound, unfortu-
nately, political reality sometimes intervenes, making the elegant theory 
difficult to apply. 
CRITICISMS OF MARKET MECHANISMS OF REGULATION 
Without question, a relati;vely free economic market tends to be a 
powerful and reasonably predictable influence on corporate and indi-
vidual behavior. When harnessed toward a social goal, the market can 
result in remarkable accomplishments. This is especially the case when 
an effort is made to regulate complex technical or production pro-
cesses. As Stephen Breyer observes, " ... the true virtue of a tax, fee or 
similar system lies in its power to provide incentives to direct behav-
ior in a socially desirable direction, without freezing current technol-
ogy and while preserving a degree of individual choice" (Breyer 1982, 
p.270). 
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There is widespread support among economists and policy ana. 
lysts for utilizing market-based regulatory approaches (e.g., Ackerman 
and Stewart 1988; Stroup and Shaw 1989; Levenson and Gordon 1990; 
Breger et al. 1991; Weidenbaum. 1992). However, a number of scholars 
have noted that markets are difficult to establish and that market-
oriented regulatory regimes must be developed with great care. Oth-
ers have argued that market-oriented approaches may not be necessary 
and that the economjc impact of regulation on the American economy 
is overstated (Daneke 1985). 
Eugene Bardach and Robert Kagan (1982) distinguish -between 
protective or soqal regulation and industry-inspired regulation to 
control or at least influence market conditions. Companies often advo-
cate regulation to control entry into a market or constrain unfettered. 
competition. Typically, the case for such nonprotective regulation is 
the advancement of a public goal, such as establishing an industry or 
stimulating private investmJmt in capital-intensive infrastructure. En-
vironmental regulation is a form of protective regulation, and Bardach 
and Kagan are skeptical about the possibility of creating markets for 
protective regulation: 
It is easy to believe that beneficent market forces will rush in spon-
taneously to perform price-settfng functions that government regula-
tors had hitherto performed, but it is a very different matter to believe 
that they will provide incentives for politically acceptable levels of 
pollution abatement, nonruscrirrUnation, and control) of waste dis-
posal sites. After all, most protective regulation originally came into 
being because society's first line of defense-market pressures and 
privately activated lawsuits for damages-had not been effective in 
deterring certain harms (Bardach and Kagan 1982, p.7). 
Even those supporting market approaches have noted that some 
market mechanisms, such as emission trading programs, have had a 
mixed record of success (Hahn and Hester 1989). Active markets were 
slower to begin than some economists predicted. In part this is be-
cause political considerations resulted in trading policies that were 
Significantly different than those advocated by analysts. Under the 
1990 Clean Air Act, emission allowances can be traded, but EPA has 
explicitly stated that these allowances are not permanent property rights 
and that government can reduce or eliminate these allowances 
GOMston 1991). While this is not a criticism of the concept of market-
oriented regulatory mechanisms, it does indicate that the ideal con-
ceptual frameworks proposed by scholars may not survive the less 
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than ideal political process intact. Therefore, one attack on market 
mechanisms is their political feaSibility. Other criticisms of market 
approaches include: 
• The difficulty of pricing permits or of deciding how much 
pollution should be allowed. 
The information requirements placed on government 
to monitor whether firms are exceeding their emission 
allowances. 
The argument that tradeable pollution rights are a license 
to pollute. 
A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO REGULATION 
If it seems that proponents and opponents are talking past each ?th~r, 
it is probably because they are. In most cases, the scholars working m 
this field are working out of different paradigms. More likely, I sus-
pect, we are seeing an ideological debate between advocates of the 
market and advocates of government intervention. Instead, the real 
challenge is to learn how and when to use market mechanisms and 
how and when to use direct regulation. 
We have evidence that sometimes market approaches work and 
sometimes they do not. We need to ask why this is the case. One 
team of scholars asked that question and concluded that a carefully 
designed trading system could be implemented. James Tripp and 
Daniel Dudek (1989) developed the following guidelines for success-
ful tradiitg programs: (1) clear legal authority, (2) technical capa-
bility, (3) evasion-proof program, (4) clearly specified obj.ectives, 
(5) problems of regional significance, (6) measurable econOlTIlC value 
of tradeable rights, (7) equitable and administratively simple method 
for allocating rights, and (8) minimal transaction costs for buying 
and selling the use rights. . 
To develop these principles, Tripp and Dudek exammed four 
programs, nvo successful ones-New jersey's Pinelands Plan and 
EPA's CFC program,. and two unsuccessful ones-the Los Angeles 
air pollution bubble program of the 1980s and a local water pollution 
contr?l program in Fox River, Wisconsin. Tradlng programs that 
followed, the principles listed above produced workable markets and 
achieved sufficient political support to be implemented. The 
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unsuccessful programs were not able to incorporate the guiding 
principles effectively. 
The choice between command and control and market-b:ased regu-
lation is a false one. All regulation involves gradual, strategic calcula-
tion and bargaining. Command and control results in regulations that 
adjust the law to reality, permits that interpret regulations in the light 
of real-world constraints, and judicial and administrative bargains on 
how pennits should actually be implemented. Donald Elliot, former 
EPA General Coundel, notes that: -
It is imporl'aJ:lt to recognize that we don't have to have-:-and we 
don't have-an all or nothing system in which we have either an 
incentive-based system or a health-based system of command and 
control regulations. Many of our environmental problems, like many 
of our other legal problems, involve a complex coming together of 
different goals and different moral norms. The system: cannot simply 
optimize any single value~like controlling the total amount of pollu-
tion at the least cost-but mustbe responsive to multiple values .... 
Thus a combination of health-base4 standards and market-based 
incentives may be preferable to either standing alone (Elliot in Breger 
et al. 1991, p. 479). 
A broader framework is needed that provides poli~ymakers with 
a menu of devices depending on what and who is being regulated. 
Some substances are so toxic that corrunand and control is needed. 
Some regulated parties are so weak that they will need to be paid to 
comply or driven out of business. In other cases a market can be 
created and environmental improvement can be accomplished through 
this mechanism. 
Where possible, m.ru:ket mechanisms can be used to encourage 
compliant behavior and avoid the legal and administrative costs of 
direct regulation. Where necessary, government should provide 
subsidies and training and consUlting services for organizations that 
do not have the capacity to comply with regulation. On occasion, 
govenunent may decide that the costs of subsidizing regulation are so 
high and the benefits of regulation so important that a business should 
be allowed to die in order to protect the environment. These instances 
should be as infrequent as possible or the political support for protect-
ing the environment will erode. 
There is no reason to look for a magic bullet, a conceptual frame-
work appropriate to all environmental problems. The proper policy 
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tool should be determined by the situation. Sometimes a market de-
vice will work, sometimes command and control is required, and 
sometimes a blend of the two is needed. 
Policy analysts often lament the fact that environmental goals 
are sold to the -public with fear and inadequate risk assessment, 
and to politicians for their value as "pork." They argue that the 
goals of legislation and regulation should be based on careful 
scientific consideration of risks. Similarly, economists frequently 
argue that policy designs should reflect a careful assessment of 
costs and benefits, and should seek to achieve the maximum pos~ 
sible bang for .the minimum possible buck. These ideas seem ratio~ 
nal and attractive, but unfortunately they are not always feasible in 
the messy, pluralistic, federal political system in which we operate. 
Sometimes cost-benefit analysis is difficult to conduct. One prob~ 
lem is that the distribution of costs and benefits can be unpre~ 
dictable and distribution effects can be more politically salient than 
overall costs and benefits. Another problem is that some costs and 
benefits cannot be compared without questionable assumptions 
about the relative weights assigned to specific cost and benefit 
factors. 
There are no short cuts. Each regulatory program must be based 
on a strategy that seeks to understand the motivations of regulated 
parties and seeks to influence their behavior. Whether we decide to 
employ direct regulation, indirect market mechanisms, or direct sub~ 
sidies, non~ of these approaches will work without a profound un-
derstanding of the parFes and technologies being regulated. 
Developing the administrative capacity in government to make these 
assessments- is far more important than making decisions on which 
regulatory mechanism is superior. With this knowledge in hand, 
environmental regulators can then develop flexible, dynamic strate-
gies to reduce and prevent pollution in the real world. In turn, de~ 
velopment of sustainable societies will become more feasible. More 
attention needs to be paid to the firms that create pollution and less 
attention to elegant but unworkable economic models and cumber-
some legalistic formulations. 
I am not suggesting that strategic planning is always easy or 
problem free. Some argue that it can only work in a politically calm 
climate. Admittedly, in times of turmoil and upheaval, implementing 
strategic pl¥ming will become more challenging. I believe that the 
potential results from successful strategic planning are worth the 
struggle .. 
t~i 
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NOTE 
1. I served as staff director on that project and Sheldon Kamieniecki was 
the project's senior research fellow. 
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